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DRUG TESTING IN THE WORKPLACE
DRUG SCREENING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR:
MUNICIPALITIES AND GOVERNMENT WORKERS
John B. Lewis*
INTRODUCTION
The past year has witnessed growing public concern and media publicity
regarding drug abuse in society and in the workplace.' Indeed, statistics sug-
gest that literally millions of Americans are using illegal drugs." The cost to
employers is staggering, including decreased productivity, higher absentee-
ism and accident rates, and increased insurance and medical expenditures.3
Many employers are examining the means by which they can identify
employees with drug problems and take appropriate action.4 However, be-
fore implementing any drug testing program or testing an individual em-
ployee, a public employer must carefully consider not only its need for drug
testing, but also the constitutional standards which the courts will apply due
to the existence of state action.
Certainly, there are appealing rationales for drug testing many govern-
ment employees and few would dispute that police and fire personnel
should be free of any substances which might undermine their job effective-
ness. But while government employees may have lesser expectations of pri-
vacy than those in the private sector, the courts readily recognize that they
have not abandoned all of their individual rights, and do not hesitate to en-
force constitutional protections.
For a public employer, the most immediate legal implications involve var-
ious constitutional considerations, most importantly those of the fourth
* Partner, Arter & Hadden, Cleveland, Ohio; B.A., J.D., University of Missouri;
LL.M., Columbia University. My colleague, Gregory V. Mersol, B.A., J.D., Case
Western Reserve University, provided substantial assistance in the preparation of
this article.
'Most recently, there were reports of drug use surrounding a train accident resulting in the
deaths of 16 people. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1987, at 1, col. 4; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 15,
1987, at 2-A, col. 6.
'See NAnONAL INSTIUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, DRUG ABUSE IN TE WORKPLAcE 1 (1986) [hereinafter
NIDA]; Marcotte, Drugs at Work, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1986, at 34.
'See NIDA, supra note 2, at 1-2.
4'The United States Department of Transportation is now considering implementing random
drug testing of thousands of airline and railroad employees. Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 22,
1987, at 1-A, col. 1. One fourth of "Fortune 500" companies have drug testing programs. Rust,
Drug Testing: The Legal Dilemma, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1986, at 50, 51.
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amendment.5 Of course, public employers must also be sensitive to nu-
merous other constitutional guarantees, 6 state and federal anti-
discrimination legislation,7 and common law claims' which might effectively
render a drug testing program invalid and may expose the employer to sub-
stantial liability.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Unlike private employers, employers in the public sector are bound
through the fourteenth amendment to adhere to many requirements of the
United States Constitution.9 Public employees therefore have greater means
to resist drug testing than their counterparts in the private sector. While the
fourth amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures has
been at the forefront of challenges to drug testing in the courts,0 there are
due process," equal protection,12 and privacy13 considerations as well. The
constitutional implications of drug testing will be analyzed below.
A. Self-Incrimination.
Constitutional challenges to drug testing routinely include references to
the constitutional right against self-incrimination. 4 With only one exception,
these challenges have failed since the extraction of bodily fluids does not
constitute testimonial compulsion and hence does not give rise to fifth
amendment protections.
In Schmerber v. California," the United States Supreme Court considered
whether the taking of a blood sample against an individual's will violated his
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. 6 Schmerber had been driv-
ing home after an evening of drinking when he lost control of his car, striking
5See infra notes 9-79 and accompanying text.
6See infra notes 80-114 and accompanying text.
7See infra notes 133-48 and accompanying text.
'See infra notes 149-59 and accompanying text.
9E.g., Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
"°See infra notes 14-79 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 80-101 and accompanying text.
12See infra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
13See infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
"E.g., Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F.
Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Ewing v.
State, 160 Ind. App. 138, 310 N.E.2d 571 (1974).
"384 U.S. 757 (1966).
" U.S. CONST. amend V, provides that "[n]o person... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself .... "
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a tree. He was taken to a hospital for treatment of his injuries, where a police
officer who had witnessed the accident scene and Schmerber's behavior sus-
pected that the accident was alcohol-related. He ordered the taking of a
blood test over Schmerber's objections, and the test showed that Schmerber
was intoxicated. The results were admitted at trial, and Schmerber was con-
victed of driving under the influence.17
The court rejected Schmerber's claim that the extraction of his blood viola-
ted the fifth amendment. It drew a distinction between physical evidence
and communications, finding that only communications fell under the fifth
amendment's protection. It held that the taking of the blood sample did not
violate the fifth amendment since the blood test, "although an incriminating
product of compulsion, was neither petitioner's testimony nor evidence re-
lating to some communicative act or writing by the petitioner."'9
Relying upon Schmerber, the majority of courts have held that drug testing
does not violate the fifth amendment.' Like the taking of a blood sample, the
taking of a urine sample does not involve testimonial compulsion and there-
fore does not trigger fifth amendment protections.2'
However, one district court has held that, under certain circumstances,
compelled drug testing could violate the fifth amendment. In Treasury Em-
ployees v. Von Raab, ' a federal district court considered the constitutionality of
mass mandatory drug testing of customs service employees. The testing pro-
gram in that case required any employee seeking promotion to certain enu-
merated positions to submit to urinalysis. Significantly, the tested workers
were also required to fill out a form listing the medications they had taken
within the past thirty days, and all instances in which they might have come
in contact with illegal substances within the same period. The court found
that the program violated the fifth amendment since the urinalysis and pre-
test form, taken together, constituted testimonial compulsion.'
It is difficult to discern from the opinion in Von Raab exactly which aspect
of the testing violated the fifth amendment. The references to the fifth
amendment were dicta as the court invalidated the testing program on nu-
"
7384 U.S. at 758-59.
Iid. at 763-65.
"Id. at 765. The Court did, however, find fourth amendment implications. See infra notes 28-
32 and accompanying text.
2'See Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1217 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); City of Palm Bay v.
Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
"E.g., Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1217 n.2.
221 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 945 (E.D. La. 1986), rev'd, 2 Individual Empl. Rights
Cas. (BNA) 15 (5th Cir. 1987).
'Id. at 951.
1987-88]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
merous other grounds.2' The court distinguished Schmerber on the grounds
that in that case there had been probable cause to arrest the defendant, while
there was no probable cause for the testing of the customs employees.' This
consideration should have been irrelevant since probable cause is a fourth
amendment, and not a fifth amendment concern. The Fifth Circuit in Von
Raab reversed, finding that the drug testing and completion of forms did not
violate the fifth amendment.2
B. Search and Seizure.
While the fifth amendment will not provide a bar to drug testing programs
in most instances, urinalysis will usually raise fourth amendment concerns.
The fourth amendment has become the most significant constitutional provi-
sion for testing purposes, and it is the constitutional provision most often
relied upon by the courts to invalidate drug testing programs.
1. Urinalysis Is A Search And Seizure.
The fourth amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... "2 The prevailing view
is that urinalysis is a search and seizure.
Though the Court in Schmerber v. California' held that the extraction of
blood from the suspected drunk driver did not violate the fifth amend-
ment, it did find that the blood test constituted a search and seizure.'
Finding that the extraction and-testing of Schmerber's blood constituted a
search and seizure, the Court considered whether the state's actions were
constitutionally permissible. This entailed an inquiry into whether the
means and procedures used by the state satisfied the fourth amend-
ment's reasonableness requirement.'
Turning to the facts of the case, the Court found that the arresting offi-
cer had probable cause to suspect intoxication since he smelled liquor on
Schmerber's breath, and had witnessed evidence of intoxication both at
the scene of the accident and at the hospital. There were no reasonable
means for the officer to procure a warrant due to the speed at which alco-
hol naturally is removed from the blood. Further, the
2t Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 15, 21-24 (5th Cir. 1987).
"Id. at 22.
'Id. at 22-23.
"U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
2384 U.S. 757 (1966).
"Id. at 767.
aid. at 768.
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blood test was a reasonable means of testing the blood alcohol percent-
age, and the test was performed in a reasonable manner by a physician in
a hospital. 31 Since there was probable cause to suspect Schmerber of being
under the influence of alcohol, and the test was performed in a reason-
able manner, the test was proper under the fourth amendment.'
Following Schmerber, courts have generally found that urinalysis con-
stitutes a search and seizure.' For example, in Storms v. Coughlin,' the
court found that urinalysis was functionally indistinguishable from com-
pelled blood testing for purposes of the fourth amendment. While urinal-
ysis did not constitute an intrusion beyond the body's surface, the taking
of urine was more degrading than the taking of a blood sample, and
therefore constituted a search and seizure.'
However, in Turner v. FOP,' one judge questioned whether urinalysis
could truly be analogized to the extraction of blood since, unlike blood,
urine is a waste product, and is ordinarily discarded. Most courts do not
accept this position, finding that an employee has a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in his urine up until the time that he disposes of it.'
2. The Propriety of Urinalysis Depends Upon Reasonableness.
Because drug testing, particularly urinalysis, has been considered to
be a search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment, its
propriety will be dependent upon reasonableness. As a general rule,
drug testing of a public employee is permissible under the fourth amend-
ment only if there is a reasonable, objective basis for believing that he is
using illegal drugs.
The fourth amendment requirements were first articulated for drug
testing purposes, although not necessarily followed, in the context of the
testing of prisoners. In Storms v. Coughlin,' the court found that the state
could implement a program for the random drug testing of pris-
311d. at 770-71.
"Id. at 772.
E.g., McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985), modified, 809 F.2d 1302
(8th Cir. 1987); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Storms v. Coughlin,
600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Ewing v. State, 160 Ind. App. 138, 310 N.E.2d 571 (1974).
-"600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
mId. at 1218.
",500 A.2d 1005, 1011 (D.C. App. 1985).
3E.g., Treasury Workers v. Von Raab, 2 Individual EmpI. Rights Cas. (BNA) 15 (5th Cir.
1987); McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985), modified, 809 F.2d 1302
(8th Cir. 1987).
3600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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oners. The court took judicial notice of the serious problem of heavy drug
use in detention facilities, and found that under the circumstances, the
state had a reasonable suspicion of drug use for any randomly selected
prisoners.
Prison guards, too, may be subjected to drug testing without a reason-
able individual suspicion of illegal drug use. In McDonell v. Hunter,' a
group of prison guards challenged a drug testing policy imposed by the
state corrections department. McDonell had been asked to undergo uri-
nalysis after he had been seen with persons being investigated for drug-
related activities. When he refused to submit to the test, he was termi-
nated, and then reinstated with ten days loss of pay. Other prison
employees had been told that receipt of their paychecks would be condi-
tioned upon their execution of a search consent form. 1 After deciding
that urinalysis constituted a search and seizure, the district court held
that the corrections department could test the prison guards only upon a
reasonable individualized suspicion of illegal drug use, as a part of a pre-
employment or periodic physical examination, or as a condition of con-
tinued employment after disciplinary action had been taken against the
employee for illegal drug use.'
While recognizing that urinalysis had been held to be a search and
seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment, the Eighth Circuit
modified the district court's order.' The court engaged in a balancing
analysis and found that the state had a strong need to ensure that persons
coming into contact with prisoners were not under the influence of
drugs. Urinalysis was the least intrusive means of accurate drug testing,
and was well tailored to the state's interest in maintaining prison safety.
Accordingly, it held that entirely random drug testing of prison guards
could be carried out along with testing of guards upon a reasonable suspi-
cion of illegal drug use."
Outside of the prison context, courts tend to apply more stringent
standards. In Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy," the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the drug testing of transit employees, but under more limited
circumstances. In Suscy, the transit employees' union challenged the
'91d. at 1220. The court ultimately enjoined the testing based upon various procedural de-
fects. Id. at 1226.
"0612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985), modified, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
"612 F. Supp. at 1126.
"id. at 1130.
'3809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
"Id.
"538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
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policy of the Chicago Transit Authority which permitted the drug testing
of transit employees who were involved in serious accidents, upon the
concurrence of two supervisors.' The court found that while the testing
did give rise to the fourth amendment protection, it was done in a reason-
able manner and was therefore constitutional.'
The court reached its conclusion through balancing the state's legiti-
mate interest in insuring the safety of public transit against the intrusive-
ness of the procedure. It found that the union members had diminished
reasonable expectations of privacy in light of the strong public safety in-
terest, and that the conditions under which blood and urine samples
were taken were reasonable.' Significantly, the court noted that the tests
were given in a hospital and only to employees who were directly in-
volved in a serious accident or who were suspected of being under the
influence of alcohol or narcotics.' Further, the necessary concurrence of
two supervisors provided an additional procedural safeguard.' Accord-
ingly, it upheld the constitutionality of the testing at issue."'
Courts have also held that a search may be unreasonable if samples are
not taken under conditions which protect the employees' privacy. In
Storns v. Coughlin,' for example, several male inmates were forced to give
urine samples in an open room by a hallway through which female
nurses passed. Other courts have expressed concern over protecting an
employee's privacy during the time at which the sample is taken.'
Allen v. City of Marietta- is one of a minority of cases in which the court
did not rely upon a fourth amendment analysis to determine the propri-
ety of drug testing. In Allen, sixteen public employees who routinely
worked around high voltage lines were observed smoking marijuana by
an undercover detective. Their employer offered them the choice of sub-
mitting to urinalysis to prove their innocence or of resigning. Six of the
employees chose to submit urine samples for analysis.
4538 F.2d at 1266, 1267.
471d. at 1267.
0Id.
"Id.
sId.
511d.
2600 F. Supp. 1214, 1222 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
"E.g., Treasury Workers v. Von Raab, 1 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 945, 951-52
(E.D. La. 1986), rev'd, 2 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 15 (5th Cir. 1987).
"601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
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When those samples tested positive for drug use, the employees were
terminated.'
When the employees challenged their termination, the court drew a
distinction between local governments acting as employers and as gov-
erning bodies. It found that the employees had no reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy with respect to the performance of their jobs and could
not claim fourth amendment protection where testing had been under-
taken solely to insure job safety.' Accordingly, it found that the testing
did not rise to the level requiring fourth amendment analysis. ' However,
in Allen, the facts were such that the employer almost certainly did have a
reasonable suspicion of illegal drug use since the employees had been
observed smoking marijuana. Thus, the fourth amendment probably
would have been satisfied even if the court had found that it applied.
3. Drug Testing As An Administrative Search.
Employers in some instances have attempted to satisfy the fourth
amendment's requirements by structuring drug testing programs as "ad-
ministrative searches." Courts have upheld adminstrative searches in
other contexts in which the public interest to be served is outweighed by
the degree of intrusion.
For example, the searches which are given to all persons entering the
flight areas of airports are constitutionally permissible because of the
strong public interest in air safety and the only moderate private intru-
sion." Similarly, housing inspections are proper because, though the
public interest is less significant, the intrusion is minimal.'
Administrative searches are permitted at least in part because they are
routine. Accordingly, they must also be given either to all persons, or be
given entirely at random. In Delaware v. Prouse,"' marijuana was discov-
ered on the floor of the defendant's car after a supposedly "random" stop
to determine whether the driver was licensed and the vehi-
Old. at 484-85.
aNd. at 491.
17Id.
am Capua v. City of Plainfield, 1 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 625,630 (D.N.J. 1986),
the court distinguished Allen on the grounds that there was a reasonable suspicion of drug use in
that case.
a'United States v. Smith, 643 F.2d 942 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 875 (1981)(x-ray of
luggage).
60Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (housing inspection warrant may be ob-
tained without showing a reasonable suspicion of housing violations).61440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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cle registered. The Supreme Court found that the search violated the
fourth amendment since, though it was "random" in the sense that not
everyone was stopped, there were no standards to protect drivers from
abuse of discretion in the selection of persons to be searched.'
In Storms v. Coughlin,' prisoners to be drug tested were selected "at
random" by the choosing of names on a bulletin board. The court en-
joined that method of selection since the individual choosing the names
could read them on the board, and could then decide which persons to
test. The court held that "random" testing could resume only once an
entirely blind system of selection was instituted."
Because the state's interest in conducting an administrative search
must outweigh the intrusiveness of the search, the validity of a drug test-
ing program will depend upon the employer's purposes and the means
by which testing is carried out. A drug testing program will constitute a
valid administrative search when it has been tailored to minimize the
degree of intrusion and also serves a strong state interest.
At least one court has indicated that random drug testing, even for
police and fire personnel, is not permissible. In City of Palm Bay v.
Bauman,' the court struck down random drug testing for police and fire
personnel, even though the persons found to have used drugs were re-
ferred to counseling and were not terminated. The court's decision ap-
pears to rest in part upon the purpose for which drug testing was imple-
mented since it expressed cynicism over whether the departments' drug
problem was sufficient to warrant widespread testing.'
Another facet of the necessary "routine" nature of an administrative
search is that the same testing methods and standards must be used for all
persons. Most recently, in Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga,67 the court re-
jected the city's justification of mass drug testing as an administrative
search because not all employees were subjected to the same test and the
testing standards were not uniformly applied.'
However, the adminstrative search exception to the fourth amend-
ment may apply to drug testing under certain instances. In Shoemaker v.
Handel," five prominent jockeys challenged a set of regulations
RId. at 662-63.
'600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
"Id. at 1223.
"475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
'Id. at 1325.
'71 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1041 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
6id. at 1044-45.
"M795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, -U.S.-. 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
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adopted by the New Jersey Racing Commission which authorized state
racing stewards to require breathalyzer and urine tests for jockeys. The
court found that the regulations would be valid as administrative
searches if: first, there was a strong state interest in conducting the
search; and second, the industry in which testing is implemented is so
pervasively regulated that the individuals have reduced expectations of
privacy. ' Applying those standards to the drug testing of the jockeys, the
court found that a search pursuant to the regulations was an administra-
tive search."
First, the state had strong interest in preserving not only the integrity of
the horse-racing industry, but also in the public's perception of its integ-
rity. ' Second, the Racing Commission had traditionally acted in such a
way as to reduce any justifiable expectations among racing participants,
including the execution of warrantless searches of racing areas.' How-
ever, Shoemaker itself, and subsequent authority, emphasized the nar-
rowness of its holding, and only in limited circumstances will the admin-
strative search exception be found to apply.'
4. Consent.
Testing is permissible under the fourth amendment if the employee
has consented to it. This exception has not been of great significance since
it has not yet been litigated within the context of truly voluntary consent.
In Patchogue-Medford Congress v. Board of Education,' the employer jus-
tified drug testing under a collective bargaining agreement provision
which required newly hired employees to submit to a single medical ex-
amination. Finding that the employees sought to be tested had already
submitted to the examination, the court found that the labor agreement
did not authorize any further drug testing.7'
Courts are unlikely to enforce written consent agreements. In Mc-
Donell v. Hunter,' the district court construed a consent form which the
7 95 F.2d at 1142.
7lid.
7lid.
7lid.
7'Capua v. City of Plainfield, 1 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 625, 630 (D.N.J. 1986);
Treasury Workers v. Von Raab, 2 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 15, 21 (5th Cir. 1987);
Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142 n.5.
7'119 A.D.2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1986).
7ld. at 889.
7612 F. Supp. 1122, 1131 (S.D. Iowa 1985), modified, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
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employee had signed as a condition of employment not as consent to any
search, but only as a statement that the employee recognized that he
would be searched if the employer had reasonable grounds for suspicion
of illegal conduct. In Treasury Employees v. Von Raab,' the trial court found
that employees seeking promotions could not be held to have waived
their constitutional rights to refuse to consent to drug testing. The Fifth
Circuit did not address the issue of written consent forms, but found that
the testing was consensual "to some extent" because only persons apply-
ing for certain positions were tested.' Accordingly, only under comple-
tely voluntary circumstances will a court find that an employee's consent
authorized what would otherwise be considered an unconstitutional
drug test.
C. Due Process.
Due process becomes an issue in the drug testing of public employees
when the accuracy, procedure, and disposition of test results are challenged.
A rough outline of the due process requirements has taken shape under the
developing case law for drug testing of public employees and may be set
forth with some certainty.
1. Due Process Issues.
The first due process issue, and perhaps that most often raised in the
media, is the accuracy of drug testing. There are, in fact, several types of
drug tests which vary both in cost and accuracy. Confusion of the differ-
ent tests is common and only clouds intelligent resolution of this issue.
Drug testing generally first involves use of the Syva EMIT test, which
is relatively inexpensive and accurate. The manufacturer itself cautions
that the test is not 100% accurate, and recommends confirmation by a
different testing method. While the manufacturer represents the test as
being 95% accurate, courts have found through the admission of expert
testimony that the test is more likely to be 97% to 99% accurate.'
If an individual does test positive using an EMIT test, a second confir-
mation test by thin-layer chromatography or by mass spectrometry
761 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 945, 951 (E.D. La. 1986), rev'd, 2 Individual Empl.
Rights Cas. (BNA) 15, 20 (5th Cir. 1987).
792 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 15, 20 (5th Cir. 1987).
8'See Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Jensen v. Lick, 589 F.
Supp. 35, 38 (D.N.D. 1984); see also Peranzo v. Coughlin, 608 F. Supp. 1504, 1509-12 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (noting expert testimony to the contrary, but upholding use of EMIT test).
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should be performed. These tests are generally recognized to be 100%
accurate."1
Taking action against a public employee based upon an unconfirmed
positive EMIT test has been held to violate due process. In Higgs v.
Wilson,' the court enjoined disciplining prisoners solely on the basis of an
unconfirmed EMIT test. Similarly, in Jones v. McKenzie,' the court found
that the discharge of a school bus attendant for marijuana use based upon
an unconfirmed EMIT test violated due process.
While the EMIT test is relatively accurate, and follow-up testing is
more expensive, the courts have generally concluded that disciplinary
action may not be taken against an employee without adequate confirma-
tion. " However, once such a test has been performed, due process accu-
racy requirements are satisfied.'6 Conceivably, an EMIT test might be suf-
ficient without a follow-up test if, prior to testing, the employer had other
evidence establishing that the employee was under the influence of
drugs.
86
Public employers must also pay careful attention to the chain of cus-
tody for urine or blood samples. In Higgs v. Wilson,' the court drew sup-
port for its grant of a preliminary injunction against the drug testing of
prisoners from evidence that the custody procedure for urine samples
was not always followed, and that other inmates could tamper with the
samples. In Treasury Employees v. Von Raab,' the Fifth Circuit found that
the Treasury Department's careful custody procedures and quality assur-
ance prevented a due process challenge on the basis of reliability.
A testing program may also violate due process if it contains no safe-
guards to ensure the proper selection of individuals to be tested. In
"E.g., Higgs v. Wilson, 616 F. Supp. 226, 231 (W.D. Ky. 1985).
'Id. at 226.
3628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986).
"E.g., Pella v. Adams, 638 F. Supp. 94,97 (D. Nev. 1986); Wykoff v. Resig, 613 F. Supp. 1504,
1509-12 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Higgs v. Wilson, 616 F. Supp. 226, 230-32 (W.D. Ky. 1985). The courts
are not entirely uniform on their treatment of the accuracy of the EMIT test, however. Compare
Peranzo v. Coughlin, 608 F. Supp. 1504,1513 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (confirmation by second EMIT test
sufficient) with Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500,1505 (D.D.C. 1986) (confirmation must be
by means other than EMIT test). See also Jensen v. Lick, 589 F. Supp. 35, 38, 39 (D.N.D. 1984)
(prison discipline based upon single EMIT test permissible); Smith v. State, 250 Ga. 438, 298
S.E.2d 482, 484 (1983) (single EMIT test sufficiently reliable to be used alone at parole revocation
hearing). However, the cases accepting the EMIT test on its own involved prisoners and not
employees.
OSee Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
"See id. at 1225.
v616 F. Supp. 226, 231 (W.D. Ky. 1985).
n 2 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 15, 23 (5th Cir. 1987).
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Storms v. Coughlin,' the court was troubled by the method used to select
prisoners since testing was performed neither upon reasonable indivi-
dualized suspicion nor in an entirely random manner. It ordered that a
completely random method be employed to prevent the harrassment of
certain individuals or classes of individuals.'
Employees should also be given a hearing and opportunity to examine
and challenge the laboratory reports. In Capua v. City of Plainfield,' the
court found the mass testing of police and fire personnel to violate proce-
dural due process since the tested individuals were not given a full and
fair opportunity to evaluate and review their own test results, or to have
their urine samples retested by an independent laboratory.
In Banks v. Federal Aviation Administration,' the court overturned the
dismissal of two air traffic controllers where the urine samples found to
be positive had been destroyed by the laboratory. The court found that
the employees should have been given the opportunity, consistent with
due process, to have the samples retested, and that the employer should
not have deprived them of that opportunity.'
Due process, then, requires fairness in the selection of persons to be
tested, accuracy, and an opportunity to challenge the test results. Ac-
cordingly, most due process requirements may be satisfied through im-
plementing a detailed procedure covering all aspects of drug testing.
2. Examples.
The federal government has already implemented a drug testing pro-
gram using these standards. Executive Order No. 12,564, issued on Sep-
tember 15, 1986, " requires the establishment of drug testing programs by
federal agencies except for those in the military. Specifically, the order
authorizes the adoption of testing procedures for those in "sensitive"
positions, upon reasonable suspicion of drug use, as part of accident in-
vestigation, and as a follow up to rehabilitation."
Employees under the order must be given sixty days notice prior to the
start of testing." The order also requires that a procedure be adopted to
protect results, and prohibits the taking of disciplinary ac-
89600 F. Supp. 1214, 1223 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
OIld. at 1226.
9'1 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 625, 634 (D.N.J. 1986).
'687 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir. 1982).
9Id. at 94-96.
%51 Fed. Reg. 32,889 (1986).
"Id. at 32,890, § 8 3.
%Id. § 8 4(a).
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tion in the absence of confirmation.' To satisfy due process require-
ments, records and samples must be retained to permit review and em-
ployees must be able to give urine samples in privacy unless they are
suspected of altering or substituting specimens.' Finally, employees de-
termined to have used illegal drugs by a confirmation test may be dis-
charged if they refuse counseling." Government agencies under the Or-
der are not required to report test results to the criminal authorities.'"
While no court has adjudged the constitutionality of this Executive Or-
der, based upon existing case law, it appears to parallel the guarantees
which the courts have required.'01
D. Equal Protection.
Equal protection claims arise in the drug testing arena when employees
claim that the programs discriminate against particular classes of individ-
uals. Constitutional challenges to drug policies based upon equal protection
have generally failed because courts have applied a rational-basis test to the
selection criteria. No higher scrutiny has ever been triggered due to a lack of
appropriate evidence that there is any improper discrimination against any
suspect class.
In New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer,'" the New York City Transit
Authority refused to employ any user of narcotic drugs, including metha-
done. The plaintiffs brought a class action to challenge the application of the
rule to former heroin addicts participating in methadone maintenance pro-
grams.'" The plaintiffs asserted that the exclusion of methadone users viola-
ted the equal protection clause because not all methadone users were incapa-
ble of performing their job duties. " The court did not accept that argument
since methadone users are not a suspect classification, and their exclusion
was rationally related to the Transit Authority's interest in public safety.'" It
also held that the different treatment given alcoholics and methadone users
did not violate equal protection.'"
ld. at 32,891, § 8 4(c).
"Id.
"id. § 8 5(d).
'"Id. at 32,892, § 8 5(h).
'"°See also Department of Defense Directive 1010.9, cited in National Fed'n of Fed. Employees
v. Weinberger, 1 Individual Emp1. Rights Cas. (BNA) 488, 490-91 (D.D.C. 1986).
10440 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1979).
'MId. at 576-77.
'"Id. at 588-89.
'OId. at 592.
" Id. at 591 n.37.
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Equal protection arguments will most likely fail unless some suspect clas-
sification is involved since the state need only demonstrate that its decision
regarding the persons to be tested is rational. For example, in Shoemaker v.
Handel,"' the plaintiffs argued that the State Racing Commission's regula-
tions violated equal protection because they required daily breathalyzer tests
and random urinalysis for jockeys only, and did not apply to officials,
trainers, or grooms. Finding that the jockeys were the most visible human
participants in horse racing, and that drug testing had been implemented to
preserve the integrity of horse racing, the state's decision to test jockeys only
was rational."
E. Constitutional Right Of Privacy.
The impact of the constitutional right of privacy in the area of drug testing
cannot yet be gauged. While the issue of the constitutional right of privacy
has been raised in some cases, it has yet to be fully addressed by the courts.
Certainly, patients have a constitutional right of privacy with respect to med-
ical information."° At this point, however, this right of privacy appears to
require nothing more than the confidentiality of results.
In Treasury Employees v. Von Raab,"' the district court found that the taking
of urine samples did violate the constitutional right of privacy. However,
aside from recognizing the existence of the penumbral constitutional right,
and finding that urine sample collection involved a bodily function ordinar-
ily considered private, its opinion reflected little analysis. The Fifth Circuit
found no need to reach the issue, but suggested that the countervailing state
interests might prevail."1
The Third Circuit in Shoemaker v. Handel.2 declined to consider the plain-
tiffs' privacy claims since the plaintiffs' privacy concerns were satisfied by
new regulations regarding confidentiality which had taken effect while the
action was pending.
The constitutional right of privacy does require that steps be taken to pro-
tect the confidentiality of test results. In Capua, "' the court also found the city
"7795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, -U.S.-., 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
"
5Id. at 1144.
'OWhalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (patients have a constitutional right of privacy with
respect to medical information).
1101 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 945, 952 (E.D. La. 1986).
"'.2 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 15, 23 (5th Cir. 1987).
"2795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, .U.S.-., 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
1131 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 625 (D.N.J. 1986).
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drug testing program to be unconstitutional because so little regard was
given to protect the confidentiality of the test results. The public officials in
Capua actually widely publicized their results to the media."'
II. SPECIFIC TYPES OF EMPLOYEES
The recent tide of cases involving drug testing is unique in that it does not
constitute a change in the law, such as the growth of strict products liability,
but represents the application of a well-developed body of law to a relatively
new practice. Because the basic legal principles were well-settled prior to the
recent increase in drug testing, the decisions have been fairly uniform, and
their application has been relatively predictable. To determine the constitu-
tionality of a drug testing program for a particular group of employees,
courts will examine the job functions and expectations of privacy for individ-
uals in the group and the means by which drug testing is performed.
A. Police And Fire Personnel.
Because of the serious and legitimate concerns regarding the fitness of
safety personnel, drug testing is often considered for police and fire workers.
Despite the strong state interest in public safety, the actions which may be
taken are relatively limited.
Drug screening of applicants as part of a routine pre-employment medical
examination is permissible."5 However, employers should not inquire into
non-job-related matters, such as the medical conditions which require pre-
scription drugs.
Random testing of police and fire personnel is impermissible, "6 but indi-
viduals can be tested where there is a reasonable suspicion that they are
using drugs. "7 A reasonable suspicion that the individual is using drugs on
off-duty hours is sufficient since the state may validly require that its safety
officers not engage in illegal conduct even on their own time."' A policy
provision requiring only a "suspicion" of drug use will be construed as re-
quiring reasonable suspicion."'
".Id. at 629.
'"Cf. Shield Club v. City of Cleveland, Nos. C72-1088, C77-346 (N.D. Ohio July 15, 1986)
(testing of police cadets).
".FOP v. City of Philadelphia, 1 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 574 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
'.City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
"475 S.2d at 1326.
"'urner v. FOP, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985).
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B. School Employees.
Random testing of teachers or aides is not permissible. However, testing
upon a reasonable individual suspicion of drug use is constitutional pro-
vided that the appropriate procedural safeguards are observed."
C. Prisons.
Prisons present one of the few situations in which entirely random drug
testing is permissible. The well-publicized drug problems in prisons, coup-
led with the negligible reasonable expectations of privacy, and the unique
circumstances justify random searches of prisoners.'2 Prison guards, too,
can be tested at random because of the strong state interest in minimizing
drug use in prisons, the work-related nature of such testing, and the dimin-
ished expectations of privacy."
D. Transit Employees.
Transit employees are commonly cited as examples of employees suitable
for drug testing, since there is a strong state interest in the safety of public
transit, and since a drug-related accident may literally be a disaster. " Surpri-
singly, recent cases have treated transit employees similarly to other em-
ployees.
Public employers can exclude drug users from transit positions involving
public safety.'24 The actual testing of transit employees, though, must be
based upon a reasonable suspicion of illegal drug use. The testing of em-
ployees involved in serious accidents, or for whom there is otherwise a rea-
sonable suspicion of illegal drug use, is constitutionally permissible. Transit
employers should provide procedural protections to assure that only per-
l'Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986) (school bus attendant); Patchogue-
Medford Congress v. Board of Educ., 119 A.D.2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1986) (teachers eligible
for tenure). Conviction of drug-related offenses may constitute just cause for dismissal. See
Elyria Bd. of Educ. v. Individual Grievant, 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 921 (1985) (Cohen, Arb.) (dis-
charge of counsellor after drug trafficking conviction).
'
2
'E.g., Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
122McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987). A corrections officer may also be dis-
charged for off-duty drug use. See New York State Dep't of Corrections v. American Fed'n of
State, County and Mun. Employees Local 1214, 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 793 (1985) (LaManna, Arb.)
(corrections officer properly discharged after he smoked marijuana with three teenage boys
while off-duty); New York Dep't of Correctional Services v. American Fed'n of State, County
and Mun. Employees, Council 82, 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 165 (1986) (Babiskin, Arb.) (discharge of
correctional officers observed using cocaine in night dub parking lot upheld).
wSee N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1987, at 1, col. 4.
'"New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979).
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sons who actually demonstrate drug-influenced behavior are tested. ' Based
upon existing precedent, random testing of transit employees probably
would not be constitutional.
E. "Sensitive" Positions.
There is no bright line defining where the state's interest is strong enough,
and the employee's reasonable expectations are sufficiently diminished, to
permit random drug testing. Random drug testing is permitted for military
personnel. ' Persons in the armed forces, however, have greatly reduced
legitimate expectations of privacy. Civilian security officials in military insti-
tutions probably are not subject to random testing.'
Air traffic controllers, like transit employees, present difficult issues be-
cause the government's interest in maintaining the safety of air transporta-
tion is extremely strong. There is little doubt that drug use by air traffic con-
trollers would justify discharge or discipline,"2 but it remains to be seen
whether the random testing could be implemented solely to enhance air traf-
fic safety. Air traffic controllers will probably be subject only to routine
screening as applicants, and to testing when there is a reasonable suspicion
of illegal drug use.'"
InAmalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029
(1976).
1"632 C.F.R. § 8 60 (1986). The constitutionality of this provision has not yet been ruled upon.
However, in Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.D.C. 1975), the court upheld
the constitutionality of warrantless drug inspections of military personnel without probable
cause. The rule challenged in Callaway provided that:
Inspections of skin areas for indications of drug abuse will be conducted with as much pri-
vacy as possible. Inspections of the groin or anal area will be conducted only by qualified medical
personnel and only in complete privacy. Intrusions into the body are prohibited without proba-
ble cause or medical certainty.
The court upheld the drug inspections on the basis of: 1) the high incidence of drug abuse in
the armed forces and deleterious effect on national security; 2) diminished expectations of pri-
vacy; 3) the rule's primary purpose was to preserve fitness, and not to penalize individuals; 4)
the efficiency of drug inspections; and 5) protections of the individuals' right of privacy. 518 F.2d
at 475-77.
"'American Fed'n Govt Employees v. Weinberger, 1 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA)
1137 (S.D. Ga. 1986).
'nBorsari v. Federal Aviation Admin., 699 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 833 (1983)
(discharge of air traffic controller after shown to have engaged in illegal drug sale upheld).
'"See FAA Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Control of Drug and Alcohol Use for
Personnel Engaged in Commercial and General Aviation Activities, 51 Fed. Reg. 44,432 (1986)
(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91) (proposed Dec. 4, 1986).
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Despite the importance of border control, and the need to prevent illegal
drugs from entering this country, customs agents are also entitled to consti-
tutional protections, and probably may not be subjected to random drug
testing."3 Even for sensitive positions, due process requirements regarding
accuracy, notice, and an opportunity to contest results must be afforded the
employee. l"'
Shoemaker v. Handel, the case upholding the random testing of jockeys,
and McDonnell v. Hunter, in which random testing of prison guards was per-
mitted, present two of the few circumstances under which random testing
has been found to be proper, due to their unique setting and history. 32 From
these cases, it appears that courts will permit testing when the state has an
extremely strong interest in detecting persons who are using drugs, and
when the specific governmental agency has historically intruded into the
privacy of its employees to detect illegal or improper conduct, or for other
reasons.
While few, if any, municipalities employ individuals who might fall
within this category, Shoemaker and McDonnell indicate that governments
may order the random drug testing of persons in sensitive positions who
have no legitimate expectations of privacy. Unfortunately, this determina-
tion will probably be made by the courts on a case-by-case basis.
III. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
While constitutional challenges have been at the forefront of litigation in-
volving the drug testing by government employers, there are also federal
and state law implications as well. The existence of federal and state labor
and discrimination legislation and state common law causes of action may
make drug testing not only difficult but expensive.
A. Discrimination Legislation.
Drug testing could someday be found to violate state and federal prohibi-
tions against race discrimination. However, race discrimination claims based
upon state or federal legislation have generally failed due to a lack of suffi-
dent expert and statistical proof to demonstrate that testing disparately im-
pacts upon minorities. Further, race discrimination claims may be refuted by
an employer's showing that the exclusion of drug users is job-related.
.. Treasury Workers v. Von Raab, 2 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 15, 19-20 (5th Cir.
1987).
1
31See Banks v. Federal Aviation Admin., 687 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1982) (air traffic controllers
must be given opportunity to retest samples).
l 2See supra notes 40-44, 69-74 and accompanying text.
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In New York Transit Authority v. Beazer,' the plaintiffs argued that a rule
excluding individuals on methadone maintenance programs violated Title
VII because it disparately impacted upon blacks and Hispanics. The Court
rejected that claim because there was no competent evidence concerning the
proportions of minority methadone users who had either been refused em-
ployment or had been discharged. Further, it found that the exclusion of
methadone users was job-related because of legitimate safety concerns.
Shield Club v. City of Cleveland,"' is a second instance in which a disparate
impact claim failed for lack of evidence. The City of Cleveland had imple-
mented a drug testing program for its forty-three police cadets, twenty of
whom were minorities and twenty-three of whom were non-minorities. Ten
of the minorities and three of the non-minorities tested positive and either
resigned or tested positive again under a confirmation test."3
The positive minority candidates raised the argument that the melanin
pigment in darker-skinned minorities might lead to a greater number of false
positive test results. They introduced expert evidence concerning this "me-
lanin theory," and asserted that the test disparately impacted minorities."
The court did not accept that argument because the plaintiffs' expert set forth
no scientific bases for his conclusion and, in fact, had never conducted the
proper test to prove the existence of the theory.Y
A more tenable position at present may be that a drug policy is in violation
of handicap discrimination statutes. The prohibition of discrimination
against the handicapped may provide an incentive to use drug testing as a
means for providing rehabilitation rather than discipline.
Drug or alcohol addiction is a handicap under many handicap discrimina-
tion statutes. In Davis v. Bucher," the court determined that drug addiction
was a handicap within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. While
the Act was subsequently amended to exclude persons whose "current"
abuse interferes with their job performance, prior addiction or a present use
of drugs which does not unduly interfere with job performance is likely still
..440 U.S. 648 (1979).
'
3Nos. C72-1088, C77-346 (N.D. Ohio July 15, 1986).
'mId. at 1, 2.
"Id. at 4-5, 21-25.
Old. at 26-31. Further, in Davis v. City of Dallas, 777 F.2d 205 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, _U:S.
-, 106 S. Ct. 1972 (1986), the court found that even if disparate impact were shown, a require-
ment that the police officers not use marijuana was job-related and therefore legal.
"8451 F. Supp. 791, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
'"29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-796 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987).
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included. " Further, alcohol or drug addiction may fall within the definition
of handicap under many state statutes.
14 1
Whatever the uncertainty under state or federal law might be, it now
seems clear that an ongoing and untreated drug addiction is not a handicap.
In Heron v. McGuire," a police officer with a heroin addiction had experi-
enced a number of work-related problems due to his drug dependency. At
one point, he was seen by a police psychologist who recommended that he
surrender his weapon and that he be placed on non-patrol duty. His work
problems continued, however, and four months later he fainted at his desk
while at work and was taken to the hospital. A routine blood sample was
taken at the hospital which was ultimately provided to the police department
under court order. Testing of the sample indicated heroin use."
Disciplinary proceedings were instituted against the officer, and he was
discharged one day before a medical examination was scheduled to deter-
mine his eligibility for pension disability benefits. He filed actions in state
and federal court to challenge the disciplinary proceedings, his dismissal,
and the denial of his pension benefits.'"
In the federal court action, the officer admitted both that he was addicted
to heroin and that his heroin use rendered him unfit for duty." The court
found it unnecessary to determine whether an ongoing heroin addiction
constituted a handicap since it was clear that he was not otherwise qualified
as required by the Act, entitling the department to dismissal of the claim
against it."
The legality and effectiveness of drug testing may turn upon the applica-
ble handicap discrimination statute. Whether an ongoing drug or alcohol
problem is a handicap will vary with the particular jurisdiction. However,
two conclusions are fairly certain. First, if an employee's drug abuse substan-
tially interferes with his job performance, there likely will be no violation of
any state or federal handicap legislation. Second, if an employee is rehabilita-
ted, he may be entitled to protection as a former addict if he can substantially
"°See Heron v. McGuire, 803 F.2d 67, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1986).
"E.g., Hazlett v. Martin Chevrolet, Inc., 25 Ohio St. 3d 279 (1986). In New York City Transit
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 579-80 (1979), the Court noted, but made no comment on,
whether certain methadone users might come within the federal definition of handicap.
2803 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1986).
143802 F.2d at 67-68.
'"Id. at 68.
145/d.
'"Id. at 68-69. See also McCleod v. City of Detroit, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 225 (E.D.
Mich. 1985) (present marijuana use not a handicap; marijuana user not "otherwise qualified" to
perform job duties).
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perform his job duties. "The risk of litigation under the handicap discrimina-
tion statutes should actually deter drug testing since once an employer learns
of an employee's drug use, it will be unable to deny knowledge of the condi-
tion if the employee is later discharged.
In extremely limited circumstances, drug testing may constitute a failure
to accommodate religious beliefs. In Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc.,1  a federal
district court held that an employer's refusal to hire a member of the Native
American Church due to the use of peyote during religious ceremonies viola-
ted Title VII.
B. Common Law.
1. Defamation And Invasion Of Privacy.
Common law causes of action for defamation and invasion of privacy
may pose a significant threat to public or private employers who attempt
to implement drug testing programs. These common law hazards of drug
testing are illustrated by the recent First Circuit opinion in O'Brien v. Papa
Gino's of America, Inc.'
O'Brien had supervised twenty-eight fast food pizza stores for the
Papa Gino's pizza chain, but relations between him and upper manage-
ment deteriorated after he refused to promote the son of one of his supe-
riors. Sometime afterwards, company management confronted him with
rumors that he was using cocaine, and forced him to undergo polygraph
testing to keep his job. He failed the polygraph test and was dismissed.
O'Brien brought an action against Papa Gino's for defamation and
invasion of privacy based upon the accusations and testing. The jury re-
turned a verdict of $448,200 on these claims and the First Circuit af-
firmed.5
The employer appeared to have been particularly careless with drug
use accusations in Houston Belt & Terminal Railway Co. v. Wherry," where
the employee recovered $200,000 based upon a false report that
"7In Burka v. New York City Transit Authority, 1 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 672,
677 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), the court found the differences between present and former drug users
significant enough to require separate classes for class certification.
'*41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 282 (D.N.M. 1986).
" 780 F.2d 1067(1st Cir. 1986). The Ohio law governing work place defamation is set forth in
Hahn v. Kotten, 43 Ohio St. 2d 237, 331 N.E.2d 713 (1975).
"780 F.2d at 1070-71.
mId. at 1076-77.
k548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 962 (1977).
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he was a methadone addict. In Wherry, the employee had been examin-
ed by a physician after having fainted while at work. The doctor had
ordered a blood test to determine whether the fainting was due to dia-
betes or to drug use."
Based upon a laboratory report which indicated a "trace" of metha-
done and a neutral doctor's report, a supervisor circulated a routine acci-
dent report among the responsible company officials indicating that the
test had been positive for methadone. However, subsequent urinalysis
indicated that there was no methadone use, and at trial the doctor testi-
fied that a "trace" reading was inconclusive at best.M
The employee was ultimately discharged for failing to file the appro-
priate accident report. In subsequent proceedings, however, the em-
ployer sent a letter to the Department of Labor suggesting that the em-
ployee was discharged for drug use. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the jury's
verdict against the employer based upon the publication of those state-
ments.M
Defamation liability may arise as a result of many communications
concerning drug use. Conceivably, a testing laboratory may be liable for a
false report that the employee's drug test was positive. Accusations re-
garding drug use based upon an unconfirmed EMIT test might be chal-
lenged by means of a defamation action, and may be difficult to defend if
no confirmation tests were performed. An employee discharged for drug
abuse on the basis of an erroneous drug test might also recover damages
for his inability to find a job if the employer made accusations of drug use
to prospective employers156
2. Exceptions To The Employment-At-Will Doctrine.
Employees might also bring claims under the growing number of
exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. Claims for breach of
contract, implied contract, promissory estoppel, or fraud could be
brought based upon statements of company policy regarding em-
ployee rights of privacy, or other promises of permanent employ-
l"id. at 746.
iId.
mid. at 744-55. Similarly, in Norman v. General Motors Corp., 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 277
(D.N.M. 1986), the court denied the employer's motion for summary judgment when it had
provided police with its written reports and notes that the employee had used drugs.
laSee Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance, 389 N.W.2d 876, 880 (Minn. 1986) (employer liable
for statement made by employees in interviews concerning the reasons given for their dis-
charge).
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ment.'" If an employee argues that his drug use did not affect his em-
ployment, such as the smoking of marijuana on off-hours, it may be up to
a jury to decide whether a discharge for a positive drug test constituted
just cause. The actual initiation of drug testing may be argued to be incon-
sistent with previous employer promises.1"
3. Other Causes Of Action.
Future case law may reveal other causes of action which might be
raised as well. Assault and battery daims might be brought against an
employer if the employee claims that he did not consent to the testing, or
alleges that his consent was obtained under duress. Similarly, a drug
testing laboratory may be liable for interference with contractual relations
if an employee is discharged or disciplined based upon an incorrect test
result. An employer who recognizes a drug problem, yet fails to take
corrective action might also be held responsible for the employee's
torts. 159
C. Local Ordinances.
Employers considering drug testing should also be aware of local ordi-
nances which might place limits on drug testing. A growing number of com-
munities are adopting laws to prevent the mass testing of employees, and
may require that testing be performed only in narrow circumstances. The
San Francisco Municipal Code, for example, now prohibits drug testing in
the absence of reasonable grounds for suspicion."6
D. Collective Bargaining Agreements.
A public employer may also be prevented from drug testing by the provi-
sions of a collective bargaining agreement covering unionized employees.
Before any drug program is implemented, the provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement should be considered.
" Not all jurisdictions would recognize such a claim due to the existence of remedies under a
civil rights statute. See Bruffett v. Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1982)
(Pennsylvania would not recognize a common law public policy wrongful discharge claim for
handicap discrimination due to existence of state Human Relations Act).
'sSee Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 483 N.E.2d 150 (1985).
L'See Otis Eng'g Co. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1983) (employer held liable for fatal
automobile accident involving employee which it had sent home for reporting to work intoxi-
cated).
"'OSAN FRANcisco, CAL., POLICE CODE Ch. VIII, pt. II, art. 33.A (1985). Legislation has also been
introduced on the federal level. See S. 356, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (providing for random
testing of airline and railway employees).
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The results of arbitral decisions where the employer has implemented
drug testing programs most often turn upon the language of the agreement,
and the bargaining history between the parties. In the case of the National
Football League,61 an arbitrator found that the drug testing of football players
was not permissible since the subject had been raised in negotiations, and
the players' union had refused to agree to it. In contrast, an arbitrator upheld
the discharge of two correctional officers who were observed using cocaine at
a night club parking lot based upon their positions and the language of the
collective bargaining agreement."a
In yet another arbitration involving drug testing, the arbitrator refused to
permit random drug testing at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant
since the collective bargaining agreement authorized drug testing only for
reasonable cause, and since the arbitrator found drug testing to be offen-
sive. " Conversely, another arbitration upheld the discharge of an employee
who refused to sign an acknowledgment of the company's drug and alcohol
policy which permitted random testing where the implementation of -the
policy had never been challenged by the union."' Just as the employers in
these arbitrations were either bound or authorized by the collective bargain-
ing agreement, public employers must be sensitive to the provisions of their
employment agreements as well."M
"'National Football League and NFL Players Ass'n v. National Football League Management
Council, 209 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-7 (Oct. 25, 1986) (Kasher, Arb.).
"6New York Dep't of Correctional Services v. American Fed'n of State, County and Mun.
Employees, 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 165 (1986) (Babiskin, Arb.).
"'Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Internationl Bhd. of Electrical Workers Local 536, 199 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-5 (Oct. 9, 1986) (Aarons, Arb.).
'"Concrete Pipe Prods. Co., Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 969, 87 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 601 (1986) (Caraway, Arb.).
6'See also Maverick Tube Co. v. Steelworkers Local 8867,86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1 (1985) (Miller,
Arb.) (employee properly discharged for marijuana possession under plant rule providing for
immediate discharge for narcotics possession); Signal Delivery Service, Inc. v. Truck Drivers, 86
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 75 (1985) (Weis, Arb.) (discharge of driver involved in two accidents and whose
breath smelled of alcohol after lunch proper; refusal to submit to blood test not insubordination);
Weyerhauser Co. v. Graphic Communications Union, 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 182, 183 (1985)
(Levin, Arb.) (employer obligated to refer employee to rehabilitation prior to discharge under
collective bargaining agreement); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Paper Workers Local 335, 86 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 411 (1985) (Clarke, Arb.) (positive screening test alone insufficient to support dis-
charge for marijuana use); Pacific Motor Trucking v. Freight Drivers Union Local 208, 86 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 497 (1986) (D'Spain, Arb.) (discharge based upon blood test indicating intoxication
improper where chain of custody not protected); Pacific Bell v. Communications Workers of
Am., 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 313 (1986) (Schubert, Arb.) (discharge for illegal drug use must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt; testimony of undercover agent alone insufficient).
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IV. TESTING
The implementation of a drug testing program, particularly by a public
employer, must be done with extreme care. Consideration should be given
to the need for testing, how it will be conducted, and what action may be
taken if drug use is shown.
A. Why Test?
A public employer should first examine the reasons why a drug testing
program is necessary. If there are genuine, legitimate safety or productivity
concerns, testing may be in order. Employers should consider not only the
cost of testing itself, but the cost of necessary confirmation, and the rights of
their employees. Courts will look with disfavor upon employers who imple-
ment drug testing programs for personal, religious, or moral reasons, and
not for the primary purpose of enhancing the safe and efficient operation of
the workplace. Not every employer should test its employees.
B. Who To Test?
Next, a public employer should decide which employees should be sub-
ject to testing. Even the federal government does not require the testing of
persons in all positions. The drug testing of cleaning personnel in most situa-
tions is probably neither legal nor necessary, though few would dispute the
testing of armed police officers evidencing unusual behavior. Any drug test-
ing program should be tailored to those persons for whom drug testing is
necessary, and should exclude any persons for whom drug testing is less
than essential.
C. How To Test?
Most importantly, a public employer should set forth, in writing, a com-
plete drug testing program, governing the selection of those to be tested, the
conduct of the testing, and the disposition of the results, whether negative or
positive. It is the existence and strict enforcement of such a written proce-
dure which may ultimately determine its constitutionality.
The written policy should first address the screening of applicants. Drug
testing of applicants for positions where safety is of concern may be con-
ducted as part of an overall medical examination. Safety concerns will carry
little weight before a court if the employer has taken no other steps to deter-
mine physical fitness for the job. Conversely, if the employer has undertaken
to examine the employee's general fitness, safety and health concerns will be
considerably more credible.
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TESTING FOR DRUGS OF ABUSE
The selection of employees for testing is also an important phase of a drug
testing program. Except in narrow instances, random testing generally is not
permitted, and is likely to be challenged in court. A legally sufficient drug
testing program will generally require testing only if an employee demon-
strates objective symptoms giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of illegal
drug use. A safer policy would require the concurrence of supervisors or
some other procedural check. To insulate themselves from potential liability,
public employers should strive to insure that only persons who are truly
exhibiting altered behavior are made to subject to testing.
The taking of samples, too, is a sensitive phase of a drug testing program.
The employee's privacy, and the confidentiality of results, should be pre-
served to the greatest extent practicable. Even when an EMIT test is positive,
all references to the test should be purged from the employee's record if the
ultimate test result is negative. If the confirmed test results are positive, they
should be communicated to as few persons as possible and only to those
having a business-related need to know about them. Even the fact of testing
should be kept from the other employees to avoid defamation liability, and to
protect the employee's dignity. Unless there is a genuine concern about the
substitution or alteration of samples, employees should be permitted to give
samples privately.
Public employers, as all employers, must also pay close attention to the
chain of custody for specimens to be tested. The results of any test will be
subject to challenge unless steps are taken to prevent tampering or confusion
of specimens. Any testing should be done by a reputable laboratory or hospi-
tal, and positive samples should be retained in case the employee requests
independent confirmation.
A proper drug testing program should provide for confirmation of any
test results. Many courts require confirmation of an EMIT test by gas chroma-
tography or mass spectroscopy tests before any disciplinary action is taken
against an employee. Publication of the positive results of an unconfirmed
EMIT test may result in liability under the common law, and may violate the
constitutional right of privacy.
Just as in any disciplinary situation involving public employees, due
process must be followed for any action taken against an employee who has
been shown to have used drugs. Employees must be given notice, an oppor-
tunity to examine their laboratory reports, and hearings at which the results
may be challenged.
Employers should also consider, in advance, exactly what action may be
taken against an employee who is shown to have taken illegal drugs. Refer-
ring the employee to rehabilitation or counseling is the best means of avoid-
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ing litigation, of helping the employee, and of preserving employee morale.
Discharge or discipline should be considered when safety concerns are para-
mount or when the employee refuses to seek or follow prescribed treatment.
V. CONCLUSION
The public has a right to expect a drug-free work environment for public
employees. However, the individual rights of those employees are substan-
tial, and due regard must be made for complying with the constitutional,
statutory, and common law requirements. Public employers should con-
sider whether drug testing is appropriate for their workers and implement
programs, if necessary, for identifying and assisting employees who are us-
ing drugs. With care, public employers can create drug-free work places
without infringing upon the constitutional rights of their employees.
